Δείτε το τηλεγράφημα
συνάντηση του «ανεπίσημου συμβούλου» Μολυβιάτη – όπως χαρακτηρίζεται στον έγγραφο – με τον επιτετραμμένο της πρεσβείας.
Μάλιστα, λέει ότι ο Μολυβιάτης είναι έμπιστος, όχι αντίπαλος.
Σύμφωνα με το έγγραφο, ο κ. Μολυβιάτης αποκάλυψε ότι ο Κ. Καραμανλής γνώριζε το διπλωματικό κόστος να θέσει βέτο στην ένταξη των Σκοπίων στο ΝΑΤο, πριν από την επίλυση της ονομασίας. Αλλά είπε ότι η κίνηση αυτή χρειαζόταν, ώστε να πάρουν τα Σκόπια μια πιο ρεαλιστική προσέγγιση στο ζήτημα.
Ακόμα, ανέφερε ότι δεν είχαν κάποια συγκεκριμένη στρατηγική για να φτάσουν σε λύση, αλλά ήθελαν πρώτα να ξέρουν τις προθέσεις της Ουάσιγκτον, καθώς όπως είπε ο έλληνας υπουργός, οι Έλληνες θεωρούν ότι οι ΗΠΑ έχουν το κλειδί της λύσης.
Το τηλεγράφημα αναφέρει ότι οι έλληνες θεωρούν τους εαυτούς τους θύματα των πολιτικών των μεγάλων δυνάμεων, αλλά δε δέχονται τέτοιες συμπεριφορές από μικρότερα κράτη.
Μάλιστα ο συγγραφέας του τηλεγραφήματος σημειώνει ότι ο Μολυβιάτης είπε ωμά «έχουμε συνηθίσει να (σβήνεται η λέξη) από ένα μεγάλο κράτος όπως η Τουρκία, αλλά είναι απαράδεκτο να πάθουμε το ίδιο από ένα νέο, αναπτυσσόμενο κράτος».
Τονίζεται ότι το τηλεγράφημα προκάλεσε μεγάλη συζήτηση και την αντιπαράθεση της Ντόρας Μπακογιάννη με τον Πέτρο Μολυβιάτη.
Το τηλεγράφημα:
| ID : | 119369 |
|---|---|
| RefID : | 07ATHENS1659 |
| Date : | 20/8/2007 2:59:00 μμ |
| Origin : | Embassy Athens |
| Classification : | CONFIDENTIAL |
- Header :
- VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTH #1659/01 2321459 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 201459Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9966 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0224
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001659
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR, MK
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: ND INSIDER SAYS KARAMANLIS
SERIOUS ABOUT BLOCKING MACEDONIA´S NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: ATHENS 1618
Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Former FM Petros Molyviatis --
who remains closer to PM Karamanlis than his successor,
current FM Dora Bakoyiannis, told Charge August 16 that
Karmanlis recognized the diplomatic cost of vetoing
Macedonia´s NATO membership without resolution of the name
issue first. But, he added, that might be exactly what was
needed to get Skopje to take a more realistic approach to the
issue. Molyviatis admitted that the GOG had not identified a
concrete strategy for arriving at a solution, but said that
it first needed to know whether Washington even wanted to try
to resolve the issue now. If so, Molyviatis believed that
the U.S. could work with both capitals and UN mediator Nimetz
on a strategy to solve the issue by the end of the year.
Charge urged the GOG to engage in bilateral dialogue prior to
the next stage of the Nimetz talks, and stressed that we
expected the GOG to stick to the 1995 Interim Agreement if no
resolution to the name issue was found. Comment:
Molyviatis´ belief that a veto might be what it takes simply
to bring Skopje to the table is another -- particularly
disturbing -- indication that Karamanlis may well be
contemplating this step. Unlike Bakoyiannis, Molyviatis is
Karamanlis´ confidante, not rival; we expect his views more
closely reflect Karamanlis´s own. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On August 16, Charge met with former FM Petros
Mlyviatis (2004-2006), who remains an unofficialforeign
policy adviser to PM Karamanlis. Charge laid out for
Molyviatis U.S. concerns about the Greek approach to the name
issue and linkage to Macedonia´s potential accession to NATO.
Charge emphasized that, while he understood the Greek view
that the accession discussion represents an opportunity to
resolve the name issue, Greek thinking had not progressed to
a concrete strategy for arriving at a solution. There was
little for the USG to respond to other than a vague Greek
desire for Washington to "solve it." Charge repeated what he
had told Greek officials: that a low-key, authoritative
dialogue between the two capitals could create a broader
context of cooperation in which a compromise on the name
would become possible. Charge also emphasized that the
Interim Agreement remained the reference point for managing
the problem if it was not ripe for solution (a point
Moyviatis had agreed with in earlier conversations).
3. (C) Molyviatis, who had been briefed on Karamanlis´
August 9 message to the Embassy (reftel), affirmed that
Athens did see an opportunity to resolve the name issue
before the NATO accession decision. It was a window of
opportunity that would not re-open for many years, as the
dynamics of the long EU accession process were very different
from the NATO invitation. Molyviatis acknowledged, however,
that it was not clear either Skopje or Washington shared this
sense of opportunity. Greece needs to know whether
Washington wants to even try to resolve the issue now, before
it formulates a precise strategy. It would be difficult --
but far from impossible -- for the U.S. to work with both
capitals and UN mediator Nimetz on a strategy to solve the
issue by the end of the year, Molyviatis argued. If the U.S.
was not interested, then the issue would drag on for several
more years.
4. (C) Molyviatis acknowledged that Greeks believe the U.S.
holds the key to the issue. Certainly, Skopje had gained
confidence from the recognition by more than 100 states under
its constitutional name. But it was the U.S. decision to do
so that had caused the GOM to become more intransigent; the
GOM believed it had unquestioning support from the world´s
main power. If that perception did not change, Skopje would
not have any incentive to compromise.
5. (C) Molyviatis shared Karamanlis´ view that a direct
dialogue between Athens and Skopje on side issues should
follow -- not precede -- resolution of the name issue. All
other issues could be resolved easily and naturally if there
was agreement on the name. To begin such a dialogue now (or
even immediately following Greek elections September 16)
would give only three or four months for results before NATO
must take a decision. That is simply not enough time to
build real confidence between the two sides. Charge noted
that more complex issues than this one have been resolved in
less time when a strong leader was determined to reach a
solution; we were confident that Greek diplomats were capable
of simultaneously handling both the Nimetz negotiations and a
broader dialogue.
6. (C) Charge asked what the GOG meant by its oft-repeated
line that it had gone eighty percent of the way to a solution
and Skopje must cover the last 20 percent. What solution did
the GOG foresee? Molyviatis said the formulation referred to
the GOG´s spring 2005 agreement to accept as the basis of
discussion Nimetz´s proposal for a name that included the
word "Macedonia"´ (Skopje rejected that Nimetz proposal).
This had previously been a red line for successive Greek
governments, and as FM, he had needed to push Karamanlis hard
to accept the possibility that FYROM´s official name would
include the term. This "major step forward" was undone in
December of 2005 when Nimetz proposed a dual-name solution,
which Greece was obliged to reject. Greece´s "80 percent"
was its acceptance that "Macedonia" could be part of the
name. Skopje needed to go the last 20 percent by agreeing to
a variation.
7. (C) Molyviatis told Charge that Karamanlis had no desire
to make the name a campaign issue. But no one should expect
that Greece would take a dramatically different view after
the elections, no matter who won. If Karamanlis acquiesced
in the invitation without any indication that the matter was
closer to resolution, he would take a political hammering --
one that would likely prevent ratification of Macedonia´s
membership by the Greek parliament. If Skopje followed up
its entry into NATO with a bid to change the name it uses in
the United Nations, Karamanlis could forget about either a
third term or a positive historical legacy.
8. (C) Molyviatis added that there was a psychological
perception underlying the political issue. It was not simply
that some two million Greek citizens considered themselves
"Macedonian." Greeks viewed themselves as the historical
victims of Great Power politics -- but could not abide
getting the same treatment from a "lesser state." "We are
used to being (expletive deleted) by a big state like Turkey,
but getting the same treatment from a small upstart like
Skopje is unacceptable" to most Greeks, Molyviatis said
bluntly. The Macedonians, intentionally or not, seem to make
an extra effort to provoke that kind of visceral reaction
from Greeks, much like the Georgian-Russian dynamic, he added.
9. (C) Charge asked if the GOG was thinking hard about the
period between the NATO invitation and the ratification of
Macedonia´s membership by Greek and other NATO parliaments.
That period could give Athens -- if it chose -- an
opportunity to spread out the time for the NImetz
negotiations, while still holding one card in its hand.
Molyviatis said he was certain the MFA was working on that
scenario, but did not know what they were considering.
10. (C) Charge pressed again the idea of bilateral dialogue
prior to the next stage of the Nimetz talks, telling
Molyviatis that he could foresee a worst-case scenario for
all concerned. If Greece simply blocked Macedonia´s
invitation without having made a serious bilateral effort to
avoid that outcome, not only the U.S. but many other NATO
members would judge Greece harshly for its failure to stick
by the Interim Agreement. Molyviatis (who in our last
discussion had emphasized the value of the Interim Agreement)
said that the potential cost of a veto could be quite high
for Greece in diplomatic terms. However, it could also be
exactly what is necessary in order to get Skopje to take a
more realistic approach to the issue. He concluded by noting
that Karamanlis -- or any other Prime Minister -- would not
give more weight to international criticism than to his own
political survival.
COUNTRYMAN
;2007-08-20 14:59
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/20/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR, MK
SUBJECT: GREECE/MACEDONIA: ND INSIDER SAYS KARAMANLIS
SERIOUS ABOUT BLOCKING MACEDONIA´S NATO MEMBERSHIP
REF: ATHENS 1618
Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: Former FM Petros Molyviatis --
who remains closer to PM Karamanlis than his successor,
current FM Dora Bakoyiannis, told Charge August 16 that
Karmanlis recognized the diplomatic cost of vetoing
Macedonia´s NATO membership without resolution of the name
issue first. But, he added, that might be exactly what was
needed to get Skopje to take a more realistic approach to the
issue. Molyviatis admitted that the GOG had not identified a
concrete strategy for arriving at a solution, but said that
it first needed to know whether Washington even wanted to try
to resolve the issue now. If so, Molyviatis believed that
the U.S. could work with both capitals and UN mediator Nimetz
on a strategy to solve the issue by the end of the year.
Charge urged the GOG to engage in bilateral dialogue prior to
the next stage of the Nimetz talks, and stressed that we
expected the GOG to stick to the 1995 Interim Agreement if no
resolution to the name issue was found. Comment:
Molyviatis´ belief that a veto might be what it takes simply
to bring Skopje to the table is another -- particularly
disturbing -- indication that Karamanlis may well be
contemplating this step. Unlike Bakoyiannis, Molyviatis is
Karamanlis´ confidante, not rival; we expect his views more
closely reflect Karamanlis´s own. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On August 16, Charge met with former FM Petros
Mlyviatis (2004-2006), who remains an unofficialforeign
policy adviser to PM Karamanlis. Charge laid out for
Molyviatis U.S. concerns about the Greek approach to the name
issue and linkage to Macedonia´s potential accession to NATO.
Charge emphasized that, while he understood the Greek view
that the accession discussion represents an opportunity to
resolve the name issue, Greek thinking had not progressed to
a concrete strategy for arriving at a solution. There was
little for the USG to respond to other than a vague Greek
desire for Washington to "solve it." Charge repeated what he
had told Greek officials: that a low-key, authoritative
dialogue between the two capitals could create a broader
context of cooperation in which a compromise on the name
would become possible. Charge also emphasized that the
Interim Agreement remained the reference point for managing
the problem if it was not ripe for solution (a point
Moyviatis had agreed with in earlier conversations).
3. (C) Molyviatis, who had been briefed on Karamanlis´
August 9 message to the Embassy (reftel), affirmed that
Athens did see an opportunity to resolve the name issue
before the NATO accession decision. It was a window of
opportunity that would not re-open for many years, as the
dynamics of the long EU accession process were very different
from the NATO invitation. Molyviatis acknowledged, however,
that it was not clear either Skopje or Washington shared this
sense of opportunity. Greece needs to know whether
Washington wants to even try to resolve the issue now, before
it formulates a precise strategy. It would be difficult --
but far from impossible -- for the U.S. to work with both
capitals and UN mediator Nimetz on a strategy to solve the
issue by the end of the year, Molyviatis argued. If the U.S.
was not interested, then the issue would drag on for several
more years.
4. (C) Molyviatis acknowledged that Greeks believe the U.S.
holds the key to the issue. Certainly, Skopje had gained
confidence from the recognition by more than 100 states under
its constitutional name. But it was the U.S. decision to do
so that had caused the GOM to become more intransigent; the
GOM believed it had unquestioning support from the world´s
main power. If that perception did not change, Skopje would
not have any incentive to compromise.
5. (C) Molyviatis shared Karamanlis´ view that a direct
dialogue between Athens and Skopje on side issues should
follow -- not precede -- resolution of the name issue. All
other issues could be resolved easily and naturally if there
was agreement on the name. To begin such a dialogue now (or
even immediately following Greek elections September 16)
would give only three or four months for results before NATO
must take a decision. That is simply not enough time to
build real confidence between the two sides. Charge noted
that more complex issues than this one have been resolved in
less time when a strong leader was determined to reach a
solution; we were confident that Greek diplomats were capable
of simultaneously handling both the Nimetz negotiations and a
broader dialogue.
6. (C) Charge asked what the GOG meant by its oft-repeated
line that it had gone eighty percent of the way to a solution
and Skopje must cover the last 20 percent. What solution did
the GOG foresee? Molyviatis said the formulation referred to
the GOG´s spring 2005 agreement to accept as the basis of
discussion Nimetz´s proposal for a name that included the
word "Macedonia"´ (Skopje rejected that Nimetz proposal).
This had previously been a red line for successive Greek
governments, and as FM, he had needed to push Karamanlis hard
to accept the possibility that FYROM´s official name would
include the term. This "major step forward" was undone in
December of 2005 when Nimetz proposed a dual-name solution,
which Greece was obliged to reject. Greece´s "80 percent"
was its acceptance that "Macedonia" could be part of the
name. Skopje needed to go the last 20 percent by agreeing to
a variation.
7. (C) Molyviatis told Charge that Karamanlis had no desire
to make the name a campaign issue. But no one should expect
that Greece would take a dramatically different view after
the elections, no matter who won. If Karamanlis acquiesced
in the invitation without any indication that the matter was
closer to resolution, he would take a political hammering --
one that would likely prevent ratification of Macedonia´s
membership by the Greek parliament. If Skopje followed up
its entry into NATO with a bid to change the name it uses in
the United Nations, Karamanlis could forget about either a
third term or a positive historical legacy.
8. (C) Molyviatis added that there was a psychological
perception underlying the political issue. It was not simply
that some two million Greek citizens considered themselves
"Macedonian." Greeks viewed themselves as the historical
victims of Great Power politics -- but could not abide
getting the same treatment from a "lesser state." "We are
used to being (expletive deleted) by a big state like Turkey,
but getting the same treatment from a small upstart like
Skopje is unacceptable" to most Greeks, Molyviatis said
bluntly. The Macedonians, intentionally or not, seem to make
an extra effort to provoke that kind of visceral reaction
from Greeks, much like the Georgian-Russian dynamic, he added.
9. (C) Charge asked if the GOG was thinking hard about the
period between the NATO invitation and the ratification of
Macedonia´s membership by Greek and other NATO parliaments.
That period could give Athens -- if it chose -- an
opportunity to spread out the time for the NImetz
negotiations, while still holding one card in its hand.
Molyviatis said he was certain the MFA was working on that
scenario, but did not know what they were considering.
10. (C) Charge pressed again the idea of bilateral dialogue
prior to the next stage of the Nimetz talks, telling
Molyviatis that he could foresee a worst-case scenario for
all concerned. If Greece simply blocked Macedonia´s
invitation without having made a serious bilateral effort to
avoid that outcome, not only the U.S. but many other NATO
members would judge Greece harshly for its failure to stick
by the Interim Agreement. Molyviatis (who in our last
discussion had emphasized the value of the Interim Agreement)
said that the potential cost of a veto could be quite high
for Greece in diplomatic terms. However, it could also be
exactly what is necessary in order to get Skopje to take a
more realistic approach to the issue. He concluded by noting
that Karamanlis -- or any other Prime Minister -- would not
give more weight to international criticism than to his own
political survival.
COUNTRYMAN
;2007-08-20 14:59
(ΣΚΑΪ,ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ)
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