Wikileaks: «Βγήκαν τα μαχαίρια στο ΠΑΣΟΚ»

«Βγήκαν τα μαχαίρια στο ΠΑΣΟΚ» τιτλοφορείται το εμπιστευτικό τηλεγράφημα που αποστείλει η πρεσβεία της Αθήνας στο State Department τον Οκτώβριο του... 


2007, στο μεσοδιάστημα δηλαδή μεταξύ εθνικών εκλογών και επανεκλογής του σημερινού πρωθυπουργού Γ. Παπανδρέου στην προεδρία του κόμματος.

Μεταξύ άλλων, ο ακόλουθος της πρεσβείας σημειώνει στο τηλεγράφημα ότι ακόμη και στην περίπτωση που ο Παπανδρέου κερδίσει, υποστηρικτές του πιστεύουν πως το ΠΑΣΟΚ χρειάζεται αλλαγή στην ηγεσία, αλλά και ότι οι καλύτεροι υποψήφιοι για το χρίσμα δεν συμμετέχουν στην κούρσα διαδοχής.

Αναφέρει ότι η ήττα του ΠΑΣΟΚ στις βουλευτικές εκλογές έχει προξενήσει μία έξαλλη εσωτερική διαμάχη για την ηγεσία του κόμματος. Όπως λέει η υποστήριξη στον Παπανδρέου είναι χλιαρή, αλλά κανείς από τους δύο δεν είναι η καλύτερη επιλογή για την ηγεσία του κόμματος.

Λέει μάλιστα ότι ακόμα και αυτοί που υποστηρίζουν τον Παπανδρέου παραδέχονται ότι το κόμμα θέλει αλλαγή στη ηγεσία.

Στο τηλεγράφημα αναφέρεται επίσης, ότι σύμφωνα με τις εσωτερικές πηγές της πρεσβείας στο ΠΑΣΟΚ, ο Παπανδρέου σκεφτόταν να παραιτηθεί.

Ακόμα, ο συντάκτης του τηλεγραφήματος αναρωτιέται: Μπορεί ο Βενιζέλος στην πραγματικότητα να ανατρέψει τον Παπανδρέου;

Ο αμερικανός πρέσβης σημειώνει ότι ο Παπανδρέου είναι πιο γλυκομίλητος και ο Βενιζέλος είναι έξυπνος, επιθετικός και πειστικός ομιλητής. Επίσης, λέει ότι ο Βενιζέλος έχει την υποστήριξη του Κώστα Σημίτη.

«Ο Βενιζέλος μπορεί να κερδίσει τις εκλογές, αλλά ο Παπανδρέου μπορεί να κερδίσει το κόμμα» σημειώνει ο πρέσβης.


Το απόρρητο έγγραφο:

ID :	125467
RefID :	07ATHENS2030
Date :	11/10/2007 1:13:00
Origin :	Embassy Athens
Classification :	CONFIDENTIAL

Header :

VZCZCXRO6869 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHTH #2030/01 2841313 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 111313Z OCT 07 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0493 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002030
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/09/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR
SUBJECT: PASOK LEADERSHIP CRISIS: KNIVES SHARPENED DURING
WEEKEND DEBATE
REF: ATHENS 1943
Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR (redacted by SKAI-KATHIMERINI). REASON: 1.4 (B) A
ND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: PASOK/s defeat in the September 16
election has prompted a furious internal debate over the
party/s leadership. Party president George Papandreou was
immediately challenged by former colleague Evangelos
Venizelos. A sharp weekend of debate October 6-7 aired
grievances and confirmed a party-wide leadership vote on
November 11. Support for Papandreou is lukewarm, be neither Papandreou nor Venizelos is
the right choice. END SUMMARY.
"HISTORIC" LOSS IN SEPTEMBER ELECTIONS SPURS LEADSHIP
CHALLENGE
2. (C) Immediately following PASOK/s defeat in the
September 16 general election, former Minister of Culture
(and political blogger) Evangelos Venizelos challenged the
leadership of party president (and former Foreign Minister)
George Papandreou. Blaming Papandreou for PASOK/s defeat,
Venizelos put forward his own candidacy and pressed for a
quick decision by the party. Papandreou -- who, PASOK
insiders tell us, considered resigning -- slowly fought
back, regaining ground via procedural delays that have
postponed the leadership decision until November 11.
3. (C) PASOK/s National Council held a weekend-long debate
October 6-7, ostensibly to examine the causes of defeat.
Actually, it focused almost exclusively on the leadership
fight. The council formally accepted the candidacy of three
contenders -- Papandreou, Venizelos, and former party
secretary Kostas Skandalides -- and approved procedures for
SIPDIS
the November 11 vote. It also called for another, larger
party meeting on November 2-4, and a full party congress in
February 2008.
4. (C) All eyes were on the two main contenders, Papandreou
and Venizelos (Skandalides is assumed to have no chance at
all). Papandreou declared PASOK the party of "radical
platforms;" it won elections when it dared to move in a
direction different from other political forces. He sought,
he said, a meaningful political mandate that would allow him
to reconstruct the party and be ready for the next general
election campaign (which he believed would be soon).
Venizelos denounced the "peddlers of conspiracy theories" who
had tried to weaken his challenge to Papandreou/s leadership.
Venizelos stressed that, despite the leadership debate,
PASOK remained "united and strong." His goal: to make
PASOK the "major pluralist party" and return it to power as
soon as possible.
BUT CAN VENIZELOS REALLY TOPPLE PAPANDREOU?
5. (C) For the public, the meeting showed illustrated
PASOK/s deep divisions. Even Papandreou supporters are
critical of him, and fear that the leadership fight will
prove debilitating for the party. Papandreou/s attempt,
during the swearing in of the new Parliament, to get a
leadership mandate from all PASOK MPs (reftel) won him no
friends. In fact -- apart from those still loyal to his
legendary father -- much of Papandreou/s support is lukewarm.
Party activists are looking for assurances that he is ready
for tough changes to make the party more functional. Some
Papandreou supporters admit that, while Papandreou may win,
the party needs a leadership change. Unfortunately, in their
view, the best candidates are not running.
6. (C) Venizelos -- whose bullying reputation is the polar
opposite of Papandreou/s soft-spoken demeanor -- is having
his own difficulties gaining support. After months of
sniping at Papandreou via his blog, he has been criticized
for attempting to remove him by a too-swift post-election
"coup." Venizelos appears to have gained support from former
PM Simitis prior to the procedural debate, and Simitis may
help him more on November 11 (Simitis was notably absent
during the weekend). But though Venizelos is a clever and
compelling speaker, PASOKies claim they are still trying to
decipher his views on key issues.
VENIZELOS CAN WIN AN ELECTION -- BUT PAPANDREOU CAN WIN THE
PARTY
7. (C) Recent polls of PASOK voters aren/t encouraging. A
ATHENS 00002030 002 OF 002
September 25 poll conducted for MEGA TV showed that 53.1%
thought Venizelos was a more suitable leader (Papandreou drew
39.2%). Nearly the same percentage believed Venizelos would
be more effective in reconstructing PASOK. But who would
they vote for for PASOK leader? Papandreou, with 44.7% to
Venizelos/s 41.2% and Skandalides 5.3%. An October 5 poll
for Antenna TV showed that 48% of PASOK voters believed
Venizelos could win the next election for PASOK (vice 41% for
Papandreou). But Papandreou was the preferred choice for
party leader (Papandreou 52%, Venizelos 38%, Skandalides 7%).
8. (C) As the party election campaign heads for the
provinces, both Papandreou and Venizelos are tacking to the
left. This is based on their reading of the election
results, which saw the two smaller leftist parties (Communist
KKE and leftist SYRIZA) increase their seats in Parliament.
But while this tactic may be attractive to PASOK voters, it
will leave less room for PASOK to appeal to the political
center, particularly if snap elections are called within the
next two years.
WHAT DOES VENIZELOS REALLY THINK?
9. (C) Papandreou supporters accuse Venizelos of trying to
be everything to everybody, and criticize his lack of foreign
policy experience. In Embassy discussions, Venizelos has
identified Greece/s main foreign policy problem as managing
its relations with Turkey. He expressed concern that,
without a "real" EU perspective for Turkey, Greece would need
to craft an approach based on bilateral engagement, the
French idea of a Mediterranean Union, and dealing with the
Cyprus problem. Venizelos admitted that could be politically
costly for Greece, which had heretofore been relying on EU
leverage to achieve its objectives. On the Macedonia name
issue, Venizelos (at least a few months ago) seemed prepared
to support a "complicated" name for entry into European
institutions. However, as he campaigns for support from
PASOKies across Greece, his stance may change.

COUNTRYMAN
;2007-10-11 13:13


ΣΗΜΕΙΩΣΗ: Μέσα στο κείμενο εμφανίζεται η παρένθεση (redacted by SKAI-Kathimerini), που αναφέρεται σε αφαίρεση κειμένου κατ’ επιλογή της συντακτικής ομάδας. Στην συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση έχει αφαιρεθεί όνομα διπλωματικού υπαλλήλου με χαμηλότερο του πρέσβη βαθμό αλλά έχει διατηρηθεί η ένδειξη της θέσης του. 

(ΣΚΑΪ-ΚΑΘΗΜΕΡΙΝΗ)