Δείτε το απόρρητο τηλεγραφημα
το βέτο αλλά και για το ρόλο που παίζουν οι εσωτερικές ελληνικές πολιτικές ισορροπίες στην άσκηση της εξωτερικής πολιτικής από την κυβέρνηση Καραμανλή.
Σημειώνεται ότι το συμπέρασμα των αμερικανικών διπλωματικών αρχών από τη στάση τόσο της Αθήνας, όσο και των Σκοπίων είναι ότι και οι δύο περιμένουν «έναν Αμερικανικό από μηχανής Θεό».
Αποσπάσματα από το τηλεγράφημα:
«... Αξιωματούχοι επισημαίνουν ότι ακόμη και αν η ελληνική κυβέρνηση αποφασίσει την ένταξη της Μακεδονίας σαν ΠΓΔΜ, δεν υπάρχουν εγγυήσεις ότι το ελληνικό Κοινοβούλιο θα την εγκρίνει.
»Ο στόχος μας είναι να εμποδίσουμε την προεκλογική ρητορική που μεταλλάσσεται σε ένα αυτοεκπληρούμενο βέτο, και να δημιουργήσουμε το πλαίσιο για ένα παραγωγικό γύρο διαπραγματεύσεων υπό τον μεσολαβητή του ΟΗΕ Νίμιτς (...)
»Οι έλληνες αξιωματούχοι πιστεύουν ότι διαθέτουν μοχλό πίεσης στα Σκόπια για ένα θέμα εσωτερικής νευραλγικής σημασίας: Το όνομα της Μακδονίας. Η κυβέρνηση αμφισβητεί την αξία της ενδιάμεσης συμφωνίας (...)
»Ο Καραμανλής δεν έχει ξεχάσει ότι η εσωτερική διαμάχη για το όνομα της Μακεδονίας έριξε την κυβέρνηση Μητσοτάκη το 1993. Πρόσφατες δημοσκοπήσεις δείχνουν ότι η ΝΔ προηγείται του ΠΑΣΟΚ μόνο με το ισχνό 1 με 3%(...)
»Δεν είναι να απορεί κανείς ότι ο Καραμανλής άρχισε να υπενθυμίζει στους ψηφοφόρους τις ρίζες του, υποστηρίζοντας ότι και αυτό, επίσης, κατάγεται από την (ελληνική) Μακεδονία (...)
»Οι αποφάσεις που πήρε η Μακεδονική δημοκρατία τους τελευταίους μήνες δεν βοήθησαν. Η αλλαγή ονομασίας του αεροδρομίου των Σκοπίων σε Μέγας Αλέξανδρος το Δεκέμβριο προκάλεσε τις αντιδράσεις της κυβέρνησης της ΝΔ αλλά και άλλων πολιτικών κομμάτων (...)
»Και οι δύο πλευρές ψάχνουν ‘έναν Αμερικανικό από μηχανής Θεό’ να επιλύσει γι’ αυτούς το πρόβλημα. Αναγνωρίζοντας τη Μακεδονία (το 90ο περίπου κράτος που το έκανε) η υπερδύναμη Αμερική έγειρε τη ζυγαριά για την επίλυση του ζητήματος της ονομασίας κατά της Ελλάδας (...)»
Το τηλεγράφημα των Αμερικανών
07ATHENS1594
| ID : | 118180 |
|---|---|
| RefID : | 07ATHENS1594 |
| Date : | 8/8/2007 2:10:00 μμ |
| Origin : | Embassy Athens |
| Classification : | CONFIDENTIAL |
- Header :
- VZCZCXYZ0011 OO RUEHWEB DE RUEHTH #1594/01 2201410 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 081410Z AUG 07 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9889 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 001594
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR, MK
SUBJECT: GREECE IS PREPARED TO VETO MACEDONIA NATO
MEMBERSHIP
REF: A) ATHENS 1315 B) ATHENS 1316
Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: With elections widely expected in late
September, GOG officials and undeclared political candidates
are raising the bar for Macedonia´s NATO entry. Distancing
themselves from the 1995 Interim Accord, Greece sees the 2008
NATO decision on enlargement as powerful leverage to force
Skopje to compromise on the name issue. Officials note that,
even should the GOG decide to approve Macedonia´s entry as
FYROM, there is no guarantee that the Greek Parliament will
approve it. Contacts with both the GOG and the GOM´s
Athens-based representatives suggest that both sides are
looking for an "America ex machina" to solve this problem for
them. Our goal: to prevent pre-electoral rhetoric that
becomes a self-fulfilling veto, and to lay the groundwork for
a productive round of negotiations under UN mediator Nimetz
in the run-up to NATO´s decision.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Since the spring, GOG officials hve debated
intensely what Mcedonia´s NATO entry means for Greece. A
yea ago, GOG focus on its relationship with Macedoia was
near-dormant; most of the center-right New Democracy
government wouldn´t touch the stalemate with a barge pole.
That has now changed. With a decision on invitations to the
A-3 countries necessary prior to the April 2008 NATO Summit,
Greek officials believe they have leverage over Skopje on an
issue of powerful domestic neuralgia: Macedonia´s name.
GOG DOUBTS VALUE OF INTERM ACCORD . . .
3. (C) The Greek public, and many politicians, have never
been fully satisfied with the 1995 Interim Accord, which
provide for Macedonia´s entry into international bodies as
FYROM as long as a bilateral solution to the name dispute
with Greece has not been reached. In the twelve years since,
progressive recognition of Macedonia by major powers
(including the U.S.) has devalued the agreement in Greek
eyes. In their view, the Accords have made Macedonia the
gradual winner of the recognition game, and Greece the
eventual -- perhaps inevitable -- loser. UN negotiations
between the two have proceeded fitfully; the last exchange of
proposals, in 2005, left the ND government (rightly or
wrongly) feeling badly used and vulnerable.
. . . AS ELECTIONS APPROACH
4. (C) PM Karamanlis -- who MUST call elections by March
2008, and is expected to hold them in late September 2007 --
has a fine appreciation for the possible impact on ND´s
political future. (We have no influence on the PM´s
decision, but -- strictly from the perspective of the name --
we should prefer September/October. An election in late
2007/early 2008 would mean Greek election rhetoric overlaps
with NATO´s decision.) Karamanlis has not forgotten that
infighting over Macedonia´s name brought down the 1993 ND
government of PM Mitsotakis. Recent polls put ND´s lead over
opposition PASOK at a slim 1-3%. Even if his lead over the
left holds, Karamanlis has to watch out for challengers on
the right: the strongly nationalist LAOS party. Based in
northern Greece, LAOS can and will use the Macedonia name
issue to appeal to its base. For LAOS, gaining sufficient
votes to enter parliament would be a major victory, and could
cut a Karamanlis majority to a single seat. Clearly, every
vote counts. No wonder Karamanlis has begun reminding voters
of his roots, claiming he, too, is from (Greek) Macedonia.
BUILDING THE CASE FILE FOR MACEDONIAN NON-COMPLIANCE
5. (C) Actions by the Macedonian government over the past
few months have not helped. The renaming of Skopje airport
in December after Alexander the Great provoked reactions from
the ND government as well as other political parties. Since
then, every statement by any Macedonian official has been
scrutinized, dissected and, in most cases, responded to. Our
MFA colleagues have expanded their talking points and
evidence (even when some of their exhibits are no longer in
use in Macedonia itself). The GOG is building a case file
with one message: Skopje is not living up to its part of the
Interim Accord, though the GOG cannot point to violations of
specific Articles.
6. (C) In these circumstances, the temptation for the GOG
to use NATO expansion as leverage over Skopje is
overwhelming. The difficulty is determining -- and limiting
-- exactly what the GOG expects to get from Skopje in return.
The answers to this question are diffuse and opaque. Some
have suggested that the re-naming of "Alexander the Great"
airport would be a key step forward. However, FM Bakoyannis
has also pressed U/S Burns and others for USG assistance in
moving toward overall resolution of the name issue. She
contends that Greece has moved 80% of the way towards
solution; it is up to the GOM to move the remaining 20%.
7. (C) Another key question is exactly HOW the GOG expects
to use its leverage. High-ranking officials have urged us to
engage with the GOM to lower the rhetoric. We have agreed to
be helpful while urging dialogue between the GOG and GOM.
But the GOG´s passive resistant response suggests they have
no strategy to shape action that would avoid an eventual
collision with the rest of their NATO allies. In fact,
contacts with both GOG and GOM representatives here in Athens
suggest the reverse: that both sides are looking for an
"America ex machina" to solve this problem for them. This
attitude is shared by the average (NATO-skeptic) Greek.
Their rationale: By recognizing Macedonia, (the 90th state
to do so) super-power America tipped the scales away from a
resolution of the name issue in Greece´s favor. As a result,
the U.S. has a special responsibility to fix the problem.
IT´S NT LEGAL, IT´S POLITICAL
8. (C) While the Interim Accord includes a one-year
procedure for formal withdrawal, the GOG is unlikely to
follow it. As one GOG insider told us, this is no longer a
legal issue, but a political one. Both PM Karamanlis and FM
Bakoyannis have distanced themselves from the Interim Accord,
noting that even if the GOG agreed to let Macedonia enter
NATO as FYROM, the Greek Parliament could refuse to ratify.
Whether pre-election rhetoric or not, these statements could
easily become self-fulfilling. Candidates are running hard,
in the heat of summer, for every vote. If ND emerges with a
one-seat majority, it may find the Parliament hard to control
-- even if the GOG decided to approve Macedonia´s NATO
accession as FYROM. The result would place Macedonia´s NATO
entry in limbo. Karamanlis may calculate that he would get
more -- both from Skopje and domestically -- from an outright
veto than by bucking the decision to Parliament.
NOT A BLUFF, BUT NOT A STRATEGY EITHER
9. (C) Is Karamanlis bluffing? Is he trying to prompt U.S.
engagement, and concessions from Skopje, in a crucial
pre-election period with no real intention of later vetoing
Macedonia´s NATO entry? We think not. He genuinely sees the
NATO decision as the last real chance to force a compromise
solution, rather than accept a gradual but definite victory
for Skopje. We don´t believe Karamanlis (or anyone in the
GOG) has gamed out the potential scenarios. His escalating
public tone (and genuine passion privately) suggest that even
if he has not decided yet, his approach will leave him no
possibility for retreat. The Karamanlis legacy rests on him;
he cannot lose face without losing electability. Both he and
Bakoyiannis have told us privately that their historical
legacies will depend upon avoiding a Greek "defeat" on this
issue. If it comes down to his -- and ND´s -- future or
Macedonia´s NATO entry, Karamanlis will protect himself.
NIMETZ PROCESS KEY
10. (C) Embassy Athens has two immediate goals. First, we
want GOG officials to recognize that, while the U.S. will
engage with the GOM, they must also do so. The GOG cannot
and should not depend on the U.S. to solve this for them. In
addition, we will urge leaders of both political parties to
avoid rhetoric that removes their post-election flexibility.
Resolution of this issue will depend on the GOG´s ability to
engage in a productive new round of negotiations on the name
issue with the GOM under the auspices of UN negotiator
Nimetz.
11. (C) Septel will report in more detail on the GOG´s
expectations of the U.S. and the friendly counsel we should
provide here.
COUNTRYMAN
;2007-08-08 14:10
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/20/2017
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, GR, MK
SUBJECT: GREECE IS PREPARED TO VETO MACEDONIA NATO
MEMBERSHIP
REF: A) ATHENS 1315 B) ATHENS 1316
Classified By: CHARGE TOM COUNTRYMAN. REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).
1. (C) SUMMARY: With elections widely expected in late
September, GOG officials and undeclared political candidates
are raising the bar for Macedonia´s NATO entry. Distancing
themselves from the 1995 Interim Accord, Greece sees the 2008
NATO decision on enlargement as powerful leverage to force
Skopje to compromise on the name issue. Officials note that,
even should the GOG decide to approve Macedonia´s entry as
FYROM, there is no guarantee that the Greek Parliament will
approve it. Contacts with both the GOG and the GOM´s
Athens-based representatives suggest that both sides are
looking for an "America ex machina" to solve this problem for
them. Our goal: to prevent pre-electoral rhetoric that
becomes a self-fulfilling veto, and to lay the groundwork for
a productive round of negotiations under UN mediator Nimetz
in the run-up to NATO´s decision.
END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Since the spring, GOG officials hve debated
intensely what Mcedonia´s NATO entry means for Greece. A
yea ago, GOG focus on its relationship with Macedoia was
near-dormant; most of the center-right New Democracy
government wouldn´t touch the stalemate with a barge pole.
That has now changed. With a decision on invitations to the
A-3 countries necessary prior to the April 2008 NATO Summit,
Greek officials believe they have leverage over Skopje on an
issue of powerful domestic neuralgia: Macedonia´s name.
GOG DOUBTS VALUE OF INTERM ACCORD . . .
3. (C) The Greek public, and many politicians, have never
been fully satisfied with the 1995 Interim Accord, which
provide for Macedonia´s entry into international bodies as
FYROM as long as a bilateral solution to the name dispute
with Greece has not been reached. In the twelve years since,
progressive recognition of Macedonia by major powers
(including the U.S.) has devalued the agreement in Greek
eyes. In their view, the Accords have made Macedonia the
gradual winner of the recognition game, and Greece the
eventual -- perhaps inevitable -- loser. UN negotiations
between the two have proceeded fitfully; the last exchange of
proposals, in 2005, left the ND government (rightly or
wrongly) feeling badly used and vulnerable.
. . . AS ELECTIONS APPROACH
4. (C) PM Karamanlis -- who MUST call elections by March
2008, and is expected to hold them in late September 2007 --
has a fine appreciation for the possible impact on ND´s
political future. (We have no influence on the PM´s
decision, but -- strictly from the perspective of the name --
we should prefer September/October. An election in late
2007/early 2008 would mean Greek election rhetoric overlaps
with NATO´s decision.) Karamanlis has not forgotten that
infighting over Macedonia´s name brought down the 1993 ND
government of PM Mitsotakis. Recent polls put ND´s lead over
opposition PASOK at a slim 1-3%. Even if his lead over the
left holds, Karamanlis has to watch out for challengers on
the right: the strongly nationalist LAOS party. Based in
northern Greece, LAOS can and will use the Macedonia name
issue to appeal to its base. For LAOS, gaining sufficient
votes to enter parliament would be a major victory, and could
cut a Karamanlis majority to a single seat. Clearly, every
vote counts. No wonder Karamanlis has begun reminding voters
of his roots, claiming he, too, is from (Greek) Macedonia.
BUILDING THE CASE FILE FOR MACEDONIAN NON-COMPLIANCE
5. (C) Actions by the Macedonian government over the past
few months have not helped. The renaming of Skopje airport
in December after Alexander the Great provoked reactions from
the ND government as well as other political parties. Since
then, every statement by any Macedonian official has been
scrutinized, dissected and, in most cases, responded to. Our
MFA colleagues have expanded their talking points and
evidence (even when some of their exhibits are no longer in
use in Macedonia itself). The GOG is building a case file
with one message: Skopje is not living up to its part of the
Interim Accord, though the GOG cannot point to violations of
specific Articles.
6. (C) In these circumstances, the temptation for the GOG
to use NATO expansion as leverage over Skopje is
overwhelming. The difficulty is determining -- and limiting
-- exactly what the GOG expects to get from Skopje in return.
The answers to this question are diffuse and opaque. Some
have suggested that the re-naming of "Alexander the Great"
airport would be a key step forward. However, FM Bakoyannis
has also pressed U/S Burns and others for USG assistance in
moving toward overall resolution of the name issue. She
contends that Greece has moved 80% of the way towards
solution; it is up to the GOM to move the remaining 20%.
7. (C) Another key question is exactly HOW the GOG expects
to use its leverage. High-ranking officials have urged us to
engage with the GOM to lower the rhetoric. We have agreed to
be helpful while urging dialogue between the GOG and GOM.
But the GOG´s passive resistant response suggests they have
no strategy to shape action that would avoid an eventual
collision with the rest of their NATO allies. In fact,
contacts with both GOG and GOM representatives here in Athens
suggest the reverse: that both sides are looking for an
"America ex machina" to solve this problem for them. This
attitude is shared by the average (NATO-skeptic) Greek.
Their rationale: By recognizing Macedonia, (the 90th state
to do so) super-power America tipped the scales away from a
resolution of the name issue in Greece´s favor. As a result,
the U.S. has a special responsibility to fix the problem.
IT´S NT LEGAL, IT´S POLITICAL
8. (C) While the Interim Accord includes a one-year
procedure for formal withdrawal, the GOG is unlikely to
follow it. As one GOG insider told us, this is no longer a
legal issue, but a political one. Both PM Karamanlis and FM
Bakoyannis have distanced themselves from the Interim Accord,
noting that even if the GOG agreed to let Macedonia enter
NATO as FYROM, the Greek Parliament could refuse to ratify.
Whether pre-election rhetoric or not, these statements could
easily become self-fulfilling. Candidates are running hard,
in the heat of summer, for every vote. If ND emerges with a
one-seat majority, it may find the Parliament hard to control
-- even if the GOG decided to approve Macedonia´s NATO
accession as FYROM. The result would place Macedonia´s NATO
entry in limbo. Karamanlis may calculate that he would get
more -- both from Skopje and domestically -- from an outright
veto than by bucking the decision to Parliament.
NOT A BLUFF, BUT NOT A STRATEGY EITHER
9. (C) Is Karamanlis bluffing? Is he trying to prompt U.S.
engagement, and concessions from Skopje, in a crucial
pre-election period with no real intention of later vetoing
Macedonia´s NATO entry? We think not. He genuinely sees the
NATO decision as the last real chance to force a compromise
solution, rather than accept a gradual but definite victory
for Skopje. We don´t believe Karamanlis (or anyone in the
GOG) has gamed out the potential scenarios. His escalating
public tone (and genuine passion privately) suggest that even
if he has not decided yet, his approach will leave him no
possibility for retreat. The Karamanlis legacy rests on him;
he cannot lose face without losing electability. Both he and
Bakoyiannis have told us privately that their historical
legacies will depend upon avoiding a Greek "defeat" on this
issue. If it comes down to his -- and ND´s -- future or
Macedonia´s NATO entry, Karamanlis will protect himself.
NIMETZ PROCESS KEY
10. (C) Embassy Athens has two immediate goals. First, we
want GOG officials to recognize that, while the U.S. will
engage with the GOM, they must also do so. The GOG cannot
and should not depend on the U.S. to solve this for them. In
addition, we will urge leaders of both political parties to
avoid rhetoric that removes their post-election flexibility.
Resolution of this issue will depend on the GOG´s ability to
engage in a productive new round of negotiations on the name
issue with the GOM under the auspices of UN negotiator
Nimetz.
11. (C) Septel will report in more detail on the GOG´s
expectations of the U.S. and the friendly counsel we should
provide here.
COUNTRYMAN
;2007-08-08 14:10
πηγή: "οι νέοι Φάκελοι", Καθημερινή
Δεν υπάρχουν σχόλια:
Δημοσίευση σχολίου
Για να αποφευχθούν περιπτώσεις εμφάνισης υβριστικών σχολίων ή άλλων ποινικά κολάσιμων πράξεων, όλα τα σχόλια πριν δημοσιευτούν ελέγχονται.
Παρακαλούμε μην αποστέλετε πληροφορίες άχρηστες προς τη λειτουργία του συγκεκριμένου blog.
Τα μηνύματα είναι προσωπικές απόψεις των αποστολέων και σε καμία περίπτωση δεν εκφράζουν τους δημιουργούς ή διαχειριστές της συγκεκριμένης σελίδας.