Wikileaks: Στη Χάγη τα ελληνοτουρκικά;

Ανοιχτό περιγράφεται να αφήνει το ενδεχόμενο για επίλυση των Ελληνοτουρκικών διαφορών στην Χάγη μία εβδομάδα μετά την εκλογική νίκη του ΠΑΣΟΚ ο Γ. Παπανδρέου σε συνάντησή του με...

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τον Αμερικανό πρέσβη στην Αθήνα και τον Πρόεδρο του Αμερικανικού Ινστιτούτου Brookings, όπως περιγράφεται σε τηλεγράφημα που συντάσσεται από την αμερικανική πρεσβεία τον Οκτώβριο του 2009.

Ο πρωθυπουργός, στην ίδια περίσταση περιγράφει λεπτομερώς στους Αμερικανούς την συνάντησή του – λίγες ημέρες πριν - με τον Τούρκο πρωθυπουργό Ερντογάν στα πλαίσια της συνάντησης της Διαδικασίας Συνεργασίας ΝΑ Ευρώπης στην Κωνσταντινούπολη στις αρχές Οκτωβρίου του 2009.

Όπως αναφέρεται στο τηλεγράφημα, ο Γιώργος Παπανδρέου τόνισε στον τούρκο πρωθυπουργό και τον τούρκο υπουργό Εξωτερικών τη θέλησή του να λύσει τα περισσότερα ζητήματα του Αιγαίου στη Χάγη. λέγοντας μάλιστα ότι Ελλάδα και Τουρκία θα χειρίζονταν τα άλλα ζητήματα όπως το Οικουμενικό πατριαρχείο και η Κύπρος γρήγορα, καθώς σύντομα τα οικονομικά προβλήματα της Ελλάδας θα του έδεναν πολιτικά τα χέρια.

«Αν θέλετε τα νησιά μας δε θα λύσουμε ποτέ το ζήτημα» ανέφερε ο Παπανδρέου στον Ερντογάν, αλλά είπε ότι αν αυτό που θέλει η Τουρκία είναι πρόσβαση σε διεθνή ύδατα και εναέριο χώρο, και στην Ευρώπη, είναι θέματα που θα μπορούσαν να λυθούν.

Το τηλεγράφημα αναφέρει ότι ο Γ. Παπανδρέου πιστεύει ότι θα έπρεπε αυτά τα θέματα να πάνε στη Χάγη, όπου θα μπορούσαν να συζητήσουν για τα πάντα εκτός από την εθνική κυριαρχία.

Απέρριψε τον χαρακτηρισμό γκρίζες ζώνες, τον οποίο θεώρησε πολιτικό τέχνασμα που δεν έχει καμία νομική βάση.

Σε σχόλιό της η πρεσβεία αναφέρει ότι τα παραπάνω είναι σημαντική κίνηση για την Ελλάδα.

Όσον αφορά στο Κυπριακό παρακίνησε τους Τούρκους να αφήσουν τους πολιτικούς να δουλέψουν χωρίς τη στρατιωτική επιρροή.

Στο θέμα της ονομασίας της ΠΓΔΜ ο Παπανδρέου δήλωσε θετικός στο να εντείνει τις προσπάθειες για λύση του προβλήματος, αλλά επανέλαβε την ήδη υπάρχουσα θέση για αρχή του erga omnes, δηλαδή μια ονομασία για όλες τις χρήσεις.

Στο ίδιο τηλεγράφημα περιγράφονται ανάλογες συναντήσεις των Αμερικανών με την πρώην ΥΠΕΞ Ντόρα Μπακογιάννη και αξιωματούχους του υπουργείου Εξωτερικών κατά το ίδιο χρονικό διάστημα.

Μάλιστα, λέει ότι η Ντόρα Μπακογιάννη χαρακτήρισε τον σκοπιανό πρωθυπουργό Γκρουέφσκι «Βαλκάνιο ηγέτη με στυλ της δεκαετίας του ‘60» και προέβλεψε ότι οποιαδήποτε ελληνική κυβέρνηση θα είχε πρόβλημα να πείσει την ελληνική κοινή γνώμη να αποδεχτεί μία ονομασία, ακόμα και αν βασίζονταν σε γεωγραφικούς προσδιορισμούς.

Τέλος, η κα. Μπακογιάννη δήλωσε αντίθετη σε ένα ελληνικό βέτο στις ενταξιακές πορεία της ΠΓΔΜ χωρίς την επίλυση της ονομασίας.

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09ATHENS1541

ID :	229644
RefID :	09ATHENS1541
Date :	14/10/2009 4:05:00 μμ
Origin :	Embassy Athens
Classification :	CONFIDENTIAL

Header :

VZCZCXRO0898 OO RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR DE RUEHTH #1541/01 2871605 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 141605Z OCT 09 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0825 INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0037 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ATHENS 001541
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AMEMBASSY ANKARA PASS TO AMCONSUL ADANA
AMEMBASSY ASTANA PASS TO USOFFICE ALMATY
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF
AMEMBASSY BERLIN PASS TO AMCONSUL LEIPZIG
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PASS TO AMEMBASSY PODGORICA
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PASS TO AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/14
TAGS: PREL, GR, TU, EUN, ZL, MK
SUBJECT: PM PAPANDREOU SHARES GOALS WITH AMBASSADOR AND FORMER DEPSEC
TALBOTT
ATHENS 00001541 001.2 OF 004
CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel V. Speckhard, Ambassador; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
1. (C) SUMMARY: New PM Papandreou took on the Foreign Ministry
job in order to inject "new dynamism" into Greece´s regional
challenges, he told Ambassador Speckhard and Brookings Institution
President (and former Deputy Secretary) Strobe Talbott on October
12. He pointed to his October 9 snap trip to Istanbul as a
positive signal of this new dynamism and his openness toward
Turkey. Papandreou reinforced with the Turkish PM and FM in
Istanbul his willingness to resolve most Aegean issues at the
International Court of Justice in The Hague, and told them that
Greece and Turkey should tackle other tough issues such as the
Ecumenical Patriarch and Cyprus quickly, as Greece´s economic
challenges are likely soon to tie his hands politically. On
Cyprus, he urged the Turks to let the politicians work and to keep
military influence at a distance. On Macedonia, Papandreou was
open to making a push to resolve the name issue, but recited the
existing position of a geographic qualifier and erga omnes for
international use. With Talbott in town to explore greater
collaboration between Brookings and the Greek think-tank community,
he also met with former FM (and now candidate to lead the political
opposition) Dora Bakoyannis, and MFA officials including the
Political Director and new Secretary General, Yiannis-Alexis
Zeppos. Bakoyannis stated that despite Papandreou´s past
criticisms of Greek foreign policy, she saw little daylight between
their policies at the end of the day. At the MFA, officials gave
the impression Greece was working behind the scenes with the
European Commission to avoid public derailments or "vetos" of
Macedonia´s EU accession path, while maintaining Greek redlines.
Mr. Talbott invited Papandreou to Brookings at a date convenient to
the Prime Minister. END SUMMARY.

--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
---------------
Turkey: Papandreou focused on Patriarch, Aegean, and Cyprus
--------------------------------------------- ----------------------
---------------

2. (C) Papandreou told the Ambassador and Mr. Talbott that he was
determined to pick up where he had left off as Foreign Minister in
2004 and work to achieve a lasting solution to the problems that
undermine Greek-Turkish relations. His October 9 snap trip to
Istanbul, ostensibly to attend a Ministerial of the Southeast
European Cooperation Process (SEECP), was intended to send a
positive message to Turkey. He said he told PM Erdogan in their
meeting that Greece and Turkey had made progress on the "softer"
issues, such as culture, sports, and business, but should now
tackle the tough ones - the Ecumenical Patriarch, Aegean, and
Cyprus. He believed that if they could resolve these disputes
Greece and Turkey could be "the center of strength and hope for the
region," and that resolving their problems could be an important
role model for the broader Middle East region. He told Erdogan
that they needed to move quickly as he thought he had only a year
to eighteen months to accomplish something given the deteriorating
economic situation in Greece, which is likely to tie his hands
politically as things get more difficult.

3. (C) PATRIARCH: Papandreou said he told PM Erdogan that the
Greek Orthodox community in Istanbul is dying, and that it is not
in Turkey´s interest to see this happen. Making the connection
with the long-sought reopening of the Church´s Halki Seminary,
Papandreou told Erdogan that if Turkey does nothing, the Ecumenical
Patriarch will eventually move somewhere else, which Greece does
not want to see and neither should Turkey.

4. (C) AEGEAN: "If you want our islands, we will never solve
ATHENS 00001541 002.2 OF 004
this," Papandreou told Erdogan on the Aegean, but said that if
Turkey´s concern was access to international sea, airspace, and
continental shelf and economic resources, these issues could be
resolved. Papandreou thought they should bring these issues to a
third neutral party like The Hague to decide a fair outcome, where
they could negotiate on essentially everything, except for
sovereignty. He rejected the concept of the "gray zones" and felt
that this had been introduced in recent times as a political ploy
and was not grounded in any legal basis. However, even here he
left a window by saying that while Greece would vehemently reject
any counterclaims to Greek sovereign territory, one could not stop
a country from bringing any issue it wanted to The Hague.

5. (C) COMMENT: This is a significant move in the Greek
position, if it holds. In the past, while open to having the ICJ
review the economic zones issue, the Greeks were reluctant to add
the whole bundle of Aegean issues for fear of an attempt by the
Turks to get them to forgo international legal rights they believe
they already have under Law of the Sea and other treaties in a
Turkish bazaar-style trade for benefits on the economic zone issue.
Although he staked out the politically necessary position of no
compromise on the gray zone issue and Greek sovereignty - his tone
and overall position on moving to The Hague was one that could
offer the opportunity for a real breakthrough. He sees this as
unfinished business from when he was Foreign Minister and is ready
to be bold if the Turks join him to resolve the Aegean disputes.
END COMMENT.

6. (C) CYPRUS: Papandreou agreed that a window of opportunity
existed for an agreement on Cyprus, and that negotiations should be
left to the Cypriot communities. He expressed his belief that the
key in Turkey is to make sure the politicians are in charge and
that Cyprus is not delegated to the military which has tunnel
vision. He said he told PM Erdogan that Turkey should not be
heavy-handed with the Turkish Cypriots, and that the Turkish
military had been too dominant in Turkish Cypriot politics. Talat
needed to be able to show some successes as he was facing
elections. Ambassador Speckhard urged Papandreou to deliver a
strong message to the Greek Cypriot leadership that they should
not miss this window of opportunity when he visited next week, and
Papandreou promised to do so.

7. (C) EU: Turning to the EU, Papandreou conveyed that he had
told Erdogan a breakthrough in one of their tough issues would
strengthen his hand with the European countries that were skeptical
toward Turkey´s EU accession. He believed in accession, not a
privileged partnership. Looking at human rights, civil society,
and media freedom issues in Turkey in response to a question from a
Brookings Institution official traveling with Mr. Talbott, he
acknowledged that Turkish shortcomings did not bolster their
accession case among some already skeptical EU states. He
understood (though disagreed with) the Turkish perception that they
had to "give up" things as part of the EU accession process, and he
had told Erdogan and Davutoglu that a breakthrough on some the
tough issues would strengthen the pro-Turkish EU accession voices
like his. He noted the EU has lost its leverage with Turkey
because of those speaking out against accession. It was important
to regain that leverage to encourage the needed reforms and he
would be working with European partners to do so. In their meeting
earlier in the day, former FM Bakoyannis told the Ambassador and
Talbott that a Cyprus breakthrough would remove "85%" of the
rationale of those against Turkish EU accession.

--------------------------------------------- ---------------
Macedonia Name: The Ball is in Skopje´s Court
ATHENS 00001541 003.2 OF 004
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

8. (C) Papandreou believed that the former Karamanlis government
had lost momentum in dealing with the Balkans, as well, and
expressed that he wanted to be more active in solving problems in
the region. He believes the Western Balkans need a roadmap for EU
accession, and at the Istanbul SEECP conference he had proposed
2014 (100 years after start of WWI) as the target date. (Comment:
this was a cleverly managed positive signal to Skopje, by lumping
them in with other Balkan countries.) Papandreou stated he was
open to making a push to resolve the name issue, but recited the
existing position of a geographic qualifier in Macedonia´s name and
erga omnes for international use. While ready to work on the
issue, he though care should be given not to "sour the water" by
creating a situation that brought a lot of public attention to the
issue and an expectation that could not be met on either side that
would subsequently undermine relations.

9. (C) Former FM Bakoyannis, now in a hotly contested fight for
leadership of her New Democracy party, had much to say on the name
issue. Proud of her 2007 effort to move Greek policy toward an
acceptance of a geographic modifier, she labeled current Macedonia
PM Gruevski a "1960´s-style Balkans leader," and predicted any
Greek government would have a hard time convincing the Greek public
to accept even a geographically modified name. While the new
government will have flexibility on other foreign policy issues,
which are much more complex in nature, "even a 65-year old
grandmother who did not finish high school knows who Alexander the
Great was." She demurred on the possibility of a Greek veto to
Macedonia EU accession talks without a resolution of the name
issue, noting that "Skopje has only to gain" by joining the EU and
NATO, and that in any case, EU accession was such a long way off
that the issue was a red herring at present.

10. (C) In a subsequent meeting at the MFA with the new Secretary
General Yiannis-Alexis Zeppos and Political Director Tryphon
Paraskevopoulos, the Greeks pointed with pride to their 2003
efforts as the EU Presidency nation to further orient the entire
Western Balkans toward the EU, and decried those (Sweden and the
UK, in particular) who were against Greek efforts then, but who
would accuse them now of seeking to derail progress.
Paraskevopoulos also urged the Ambassador and Talbott not to lose
sight of the strategic importance of Serbia in the region. "We
favor the European perspective of FYROM," he said, "but not at the
expense of Greece." Referring to the European Commission "progress
reports" due out October 14 for candidate and accession countries,
Zeppos and Paraskevopoulos indicated they hoped the Commission
would issue the Macedonia report in a smart manner, which would
avoid public confrontation. "If the Commission wants a Greek no,
it will get a no," stated Paraskevopoulos, "but we will be positive
if they give some possibilities by encouraging the other side."

-------------------------------------
Talbott Invite to Papandreou
-------------------------------------

11. (C) In Athens to foster Brookings´ contacts with the Greek
think-tank community and to explore future possibilities for
collaboration, Mr. Talbott invited Papandreou to Brookings for a
speech and small-group discussions at a future date of Papandreou´s
convenience. He also offered to try to facilitate contact with the
ATHENS 00001541 004.2 OF 004
new Administration´s e-governance team, responsible for the
groundbreaking use of communications technology both during the
campaign and following the President´s inauguration. Papandreou is
clearly enamored by the Obama administration´s tech-savviness (many
pundits here have noted the similarities in the two campaigns), and
has launched an effort -- revolutionary by the standards of Greek
governance -- to modernize and digitize the Greek government´s
interaction with citizens. He spoke passionately with the
Ambassador and Mr. Talbott of the need to tap into his society´s
talents and the desire of citizens to serve and solve complex
problems, through the innovative use of technology, and had invited
two members of his e-governance team to the meeting.
Speckhard
;2009-10-14 16:05 

πηγή: "νέοι Φάκελοι", Καθημερινή