Το έγγραφο της Τρόικα προς την κυβέρνηση.Τι ζητάει και τι απ'όλα αυτά δέχονται οι κοινωνικοί εταίροι.

Σε κείμενο που αποτελεί προτάσεις εργασίας προς την κυβέρνηση ο επικεφαλής της Τρόικα στην χώρα μας,Μπομπ Τράα κάνει υποδείξες , για τα μέτρα που θα πρέπει να ληφθούν μεταξύ άλλων και στον ιδιωτικό τομέα.Το έγγραφο παρουσιάζει σήμερα η ηλεκτρονική εφημερίδα tovima.gr το οποίο μεταξύ άλλων αναφέρει:



Η τρόικα, στη συνάντηση με τον πρωθυπουργό κ. Λουκά Παπαδήμο, δεν δέχθηκε τα επιχειρήματα της ελληνικής πλευράς για να μην καταργηθούν ο 13ος και 14ος μισθός παρ΄ότι μια τέτοια απόφαση θα πλήξει βραχυπρόθεσμα τη ζήτηση και θα οδηγήσει σε μεγαλύτερη ύφεση.

Κι αυτό γιατί, όπως επισημάνθηκε, το μεγάλο πρόβλημα είναι στις ΔΕΚΟ, στις τράπεζες οι οποίες παρ΄ότι έχουν εκτεθεί στον ανταγωνισμό λειτουργούν με τις συμβάσεις και τους κανονισμούς εργασίας που ίσχυαν όταν ήταν κρατικές, αλλά και στις υπηρεσίες που επηρεάζουν όλη την οικονομία (ΔΕΗ, ΟΤΕ, εταιρείες δικτύων).

Η ελληνική πλευρά θα επιμείνει να βρεθεί μια «χρυσή τομή» στις αλλαγές εργασιακών σχέσεων και στη μείωση του μισθολογικού κόστους, αλλά η τρόικα επιμένει.

Την Πέμπτη ολοκληρώνεται η αξιολόγηση της ελληνικής οικονομίας και μέχρι τότε πρέπει να έχουν ληφθεί όλες οι αποφάσεις για τα επόμενα μέτρα και διαρθρωτικές αλλαγές στην οικονομία.

Παρά τις διαψεύσεις ορισμένων παραγόντων της Ευρωπαϊκής Επιτροπής, στο κείμενο αναφέρονται σαφέστατα ο 13ος και 14ος μισθός, όπως και οι ωριμάνσεις των μισθών, οι συλλογικές συμβάσεις αλλά και οι περιορισμοί στις απολύσεις και η «ανελαστικότητα» του χρόνου απασχόλησης.

Στο κείμενο της τρόικα στο οποίο στηρίχθηκαν όλες οι συζητήσεις της ελληνικής πλευράς με τους τεχνοκράτες του ΔΝΤ παρουσιάζονται στο εισαγωγικό μέρος «οι δυσκαμψίες στην ελληνική αγορά εργασίας» και γίνονται σαφείς συστάσεις προς την κυβέρνηση.

Τα βασικά σημεία για τα μέτρα που έρχονται, στο έγγραφο που παρουσιάζει σήμετα το «Βήμα» είναι τα εξής:

ΔΕΚΟ

Στο στόχαστρο μπαίνουν:

- Οι ωριμάνσεις μισθών (μια εταιρεία αναφέρει ότι δίνει μισθολογικές αυξήσεις 2,2% λόγω ωρίμανσης)

- Η έλλειψη σύνδεσης των αποδοχών με την επίδοση του εργαζομένου.

- Οι πολλαπλές παροχές (μια εταιρεία αναφέρει 150 παροχές και μπόνους που εγγράφονται στη συλλογική σύμβαση εργασίας και καταβάλλονται επιπλέον των προβλεπομένων της εθνικής σύμβασης).

- Η ανελαστικότητα σε ό,τι αφορά τον τόπο εργασίας (μεταφορές προσωπικού).

- Οι υπερωρίες, που είναι περισσότερες και ακριβότερες από αυτές που χορηγούν οι ανταγωνιστικές εταιρείες του ιδιωτικού τομέα.

- Οι υψηλότερες εισφορές κοινωνικής ασφάλισης (μια εταιρεία αναφέρει εισφορές 36% για τους προσληφθέντες προ του 1993 εργαζομένους, ενώ οι εισφορές για τους ασφαλισμένους στο ΙΚΑ είναι 20%)

Ιδιωτικός τομέας

Στο στόχαστρο μπαίνουν:
- Ο 13ος και ο 14ος μισθός, που είναι νομικά κατοχυρωμένοι στον ιδιωτικό τομέα (οι τράπεζες πληρώνουν ακόμη και 14μιση μισθούς). Στο δημόσιο τομέα περιορίστηκαν. Οπως αναφέρουν ενώ η καταβολή του μισθού σε 14 δόσεις δεν αποτελεί από μόνη της μια διαστροφή του συστήματος, η υποχρεωτικότητα της ρύθμισης προκαλεί δυσκαμψίες. Προτείνει λοιπόν η Τρόικα την οριζόντα κατάργηση του 13ου και του 14ου μισθού, και δίνει τη δυνατότητα στις επιχειρήσεις να προσφέρουν προαιρετικά με τη μορφή μπόνους σε επίπεδο ατομικών συμφωνιών με τους εργαζόμενους.

- Οι συλλογικές συμβάσεις εργασίας. Ολες οι συλλογικές συμβάσεις που λήγουν μετατρέπονται αυτομάτως σε ιδιωτικές σε περίπτωση που παρέλθουν έξι μήνες και δεν ανανεωθούν.

- Η ανελαστικότητα του χρόνου απασχόλησης. Οι απαγορεύσεις της υπερωριακής απασχόλησης, της απασχόλησης το Σαββατοκύριακο και των αλλαγών στο ωράριο είναι επιζήμιες στον τουριστικό κλάδο. Επιπλέον, η μείωση του ωραρίου μέσω της μερικής απασχόλησης πρέπει να γίνεται μόνο μειώνοντας τις εργάσιμες ημέρες και όχι τις ώρες της ημερήσιας απασχόλησης.

- Οι περιορισμοί στις προσλήψεις και τις απολύσεις. Η πρόσφατη απελευθέρωση της αγοράς (το υψηλότερο όριο ομαδικών απολύσεων) δεν εφαρμόζεται σε όλες τις εταιρείες. Επιπλέον, σε ορισμένες εταιρείες και κλάδους όπου είναι απαραίτητη μια μείωση του εργατικού δυναμικού, η διεύθυνση δεν έχει τη δυνατότητα να επιλέξει ποιους θα απολύσει.

- Οι μηχανισμοί μεσολάβησης και διαιτησίας, που είναι αναποτελεσματικοί και χρονοβόροι, καθώς βασίζονται υπερβολικά στους νόμους.

- Στο στόχαστρο είναι τέλος ο τρόπος λειτουργίας της ελληνικής Δικαιοσύνης. Οι δικαστικές διαδικασίες είναι υπερβολικά χρονοβόρες, εκτιμά η τρόικα και προτείνει την υιοθέτηση διαδικασιών που εφαρμόζονται στα ειδικά φορολογικά δικαστήρια.

Τι αντιπροτείνουν οι κοινωνικοί εταίροιΑπέναντι σ΄ αυτές τις προτάσεις κυβέρνηση και κοινωνικοί εταίροι αναζητούν τη χρυσή τομή που φαίνεται να βρίσκεται στο «πάγωμα» των αποδοχών του ιδιωτικού τομέα για δύο χρόνια 2013 και 2014.
Οι εκπρόσωποι των εργοδοτών και της ΓΣΕΕ - που συναντώνται εκ νέου πιθανότατα την Τετάρτη - υπό το φως πλέον και της επιστολής της τρόικα προβάλουν «ως λύση» το διετές πάγωμα των μισθών (2013, 2014), το οποίο θα αφήσει ανέγγιχτη την Εθνική Γενική Συλλογική Σύμβαση Εργασίας.
Η ΓΣΕΕ δεν δέχεται καμία παρέμβαση στη σύμβαση, ζητώντας να χορηγηθεί η αύξηση του Ιουλίου (περίπου 2,5%) και να μην περικοπούν 13ος και 14ος μισθός. Τα αιτήματα της ΓΣΕΕ φαίνεται να συμμερίζεται και η Νέα Δημοκρατία, μες τον πρόεδρος της οποίας κ. Αντ. Σαμαρά συναντήθηκε την Δευτέρα το προεδρείο της οργάνωσης. Ο κ. Σαμαράς συμφώνησε με τη ΓΣΕΕ ότι δεν πρέπει να προωθηθεί η κατάργηση του 13ου και 14ου μισθού, η μείωση του κατώτατου μισθού και οι οριζόντιες περικοπές στις επικουρικές συντάξεις.

Από την πλευρά της η τρόικα ζητά μετ' επιτάσεως την περικοπή δύο μισθών ετησίως από τους εργαζόμενους του ιδιωτικού τομέα, προκειμένου να βελτιωθεί ο δείκτης ανταγωνιστικότητας της ελληνικής οικονομίας.

Ήδη οι εκπρόσωποι των δανειστών έχουν διατυπώσει τις προτάσεις τους προς την ελληνική κυβέρνηση και αναμένουν την οριστικοποίηση των μέτρων, ώστε να ακολουθήσει η σύναψη της νέας δανειακής σύμβασης. Μάλιστα, προκειμένου να αποφευχθεί η ένταση γύρω από τα μέτρα που θα οδηγήσουν στο αντίστοιχο οικονομικό αποτέλεσμα, τρόικα αφήνει στην κυβέρνηση το περιθώριο επιλογής τους, αρκεί να οδηγούν σε αντίστοιχες μειώσεις.

Το υπουργείο Εργασίας από την πλευρά του, τηρεί στάση αναμονής, αναμένοντας τις διαβουλεύσεις των κοινωνικών εταίρων, χωρίς να θέτει συγκεκριμένη ατζέντα μέτρων, πλην της μείωσης του μη μισθολογικού κόστους εργασίας.

Οι προτάσεις μέτρων που βρίσκονται στο τραπέζι των συζητήσεων της ΓΣΕΕ με τους εργοδοτικούς φορείς και οι αντίστοιχες θέσεις όλων των κοινωνικών εταίρων αφορούν τα εξής:

1. Μείωση των κατώτατων αμοιβών. Το έχει θέσει η τρόικα αλλά με το μέτρο αυτό διαφωνεί το σύνολο των εργοδοτικών και εργατικών φορέων.
2. Περικοπή του 13ου και 14ου μισθού. Διαφωνεί η ΓΣΕΕ, η ΓΣΕΒΕΕ (επαγγελματοβιοτέχνες) και οι έμποροι, ενώ ο ΣΕΒ φαίνεται να συζητά την περικοπή τους από ένα ύψος μισθού και άνω.

3. Διετές «πάγωμα» μισθών και ωριμάνσεων (τριετίες πολυετίες). Το ζητούν οι εργοδοτικές οργανώσεις - προκειμένου να μειωθεί το μισθολογικό κόστος των επιχειρήσεων - αντιδρά η ΓΣΕΕ τόσο για την αύξηση που προβλέπεται στη σύμβαση (2,5% από 1.7.2012), όσο και για τις ωριμάνσεις των κατώτατων αμοιβών.

4. Μείωση του μη μισθολογικού κόστους (εισφορές εργοδοτών - εργαζομένων). Συμφωνούν εργοδότες και εργαζόμενοι, ωστόσο η ΓΣΕΕ θέτει ως προϋπόθεση την αναπλήρωση των εσόδων που θα απολέσουν τα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία και ο ΟΑΕΔ από την μείωση των εισφορών.

ΟΛΟΚΛΗΡΗ Η ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ ΣΤΑ ΑΓΓΛΙΚΑ:

Greece—Distortions from Special Labor Regimes and Legacy Problems

The private labor market in Greece is compartmentalized and distorted, with especially

heavy restrictions imposed on ex-state companies. These distortions adversely affect

domestic and external competition, productivity, and growth. Removing them will require

legal interventions, but also the bargaining playing field between employers and unions

should be leveled to facilitate better market outcomes and allow restructuring to take place.

Macroeconomic background

The Greek labor market is segmented and not sufficiently flexible. The most prominent

divide is between employment conditions in the public sector and the private sector. But even

within the private sector, segmentation and rigidities are evident. While different industries

confront different economic and workplace conditions, and therefore labor arrangements

between these disparate industries vary and give rise to alternative bargaining and

employment conditions, there are even different labor classes within industries and within

individual firms.

For example, some state-owned companies have undertaken reforms over the last two years

to restrict tenure, introduce performance incentives, and reduce wages by some 35 percent,

but private ex-state companies have not been able to remove privileges from the 1970-1990s.

Also, the purely private companies have been adjusting within their own set of restrictions.

This has further widened the gap between ex-state companies and others in the labor market.

Segmentation and compartmentalization of the labor market are manifestations of obstacles

to labor allocation and wage formation. These distortions make it difficult for the economy to

adjust to shocks and are therefore macro relevant, especially in a time of crisis. Greece is

trying to reallocate capital and labor resources to export industries and also, in the domestic

economy in general, achieve lower costs for many vital inputs in the production process.

When labor markets have difficulties adjusting prices and volumes, such reallocation of

resources and lowering of costs are impeded and the required recession to squeeze out the

costs by means of exaggerated unemployment will be larger than otherwise necessary.

Indeed, companies that have good growth and export potential may be unable to reach this

potential given the obstacles they face, and therefore may create fewer jobs than otherwise

would be the case. This is a net loss for Greece that can be corrected if policies are adjusted.

Examples of special labor regimes in Greece that cause important distortions and elevated

supply costs can be found in the

network industries (utilities—telecom, energy, water),

banking industry

(restricted)

2

Utilities and some manufacturing firms are typical examples where previous public

ownership has carried into the industry or firm “legacy” labor relations that are harmful to

competition, but that are nevertheless not removed from the firms as these become majority

private companies, because incumbent unions have no economic, legal, or regulatory

incentives to surrender privileges relative to their pure private sector counterparts. Utilities,

banks, and professional services among others, provide crucial inputs to government, firms,

and households, so if their costs are elevated, the entire economy loses competitiveness.

For the privatization program, the issue of “legacy” labor conditions is also important

because investors will require a discount before proceeding to take over public sector firms

with rigid labor conditions and high costs. Further, restructuring and follow up investments

will be impeded if labor volumes and prices cannot be adjusted rapidly after privatization to

position the firms for competition in the private sector and export markets.

With respect to the banking sector, reducing labor costs will be critical to strengthen the

banks’ capital position and in the private education sector, there are more restrictions on

wage levels and dismissals than in other private sectors, and labor agreements are

conditioned by law and cannot be adjusted between the employer and the employees. For

example, in case of a reduction in the workforce, the law restricts the freedom of private

schools to adapt their headcount, and to separate the weaker performers.

Top managers in firms afflicted by distortions are convinced that fostering a level playing

field in labor conditions inside and across firms and sectors will lead to increased labor

productivity and investment, lower unemployment, and higher growth rates.

, some manufacturing industries, transport, but also in professionalservice sectors, education, and even tourism.

Examples of legacy problems and other distortions

The distortions tend to be rooted in firms’ internal regulations and/or collective agreements

dating back to 1970s, which lead to elevated labor costs via favorable clauses for certain

groups of (grandfathered, if privatized) employees. Over time, many of these conditions have

been converted into law, which have remained unaddressed by recent labor laws and reforms.

Such special clauses include:

Among

-

1

pensionable age or completion of specific employment in the company; and (ii) insufficiency in performing

duties, disciplinary measure of dismissal, and inability for any kind of work due to illness. In practice, these

conditions have proven to be highly restrictive in manpower management.

legacy problems:Tenure for certain groups of employees (one firm reports 75% legacy staff with tenure)1Tenure is established given that employees can only be dismissed if two conditions are satisfied: (i) reaching

3

-

and/or increases of allowances based on the duration of the service irrespective of

productivity and cyclical conditions. (one firm reports 2.2% maturity wage increase each

year).

-

assessment.

-

these are paid monthly on top of the national collective agreement)

-

-

-

benefits (e.g. one company has pension contributions of 36 percent for its pre-1993

employees compared to 20 percent for IKA-insured employees)

Among issues that affect the

Maturity coefficient that provides for several types of automatic wage developmentsLack of pay for performance. Disconnect between remuneration and performanceMultiple allowances (one firm reports 150 allowances in its collective labor agreement;Work place inflexibility in personnel transfers and work floor assignmentLegacy overtime compensation that is higher than in competing private sector firms.Higher social security contributions than competitors based on legacy social securityoverall private sector labor market:

-

wages) even though these have been eliminated in the public sector.

wage bill in 14 installments is not a distortion by itself, making this obligatory introduces

rigidities.

-

six months after the expiration of a collective agreement if no new agreement is

concluded (“after effect”).

during difficult times, unless in firms that are seriously endangered already. Further, the

initiation of a labor arbitration procedure is compulsory for an employer if so requested

by the Unions.

2

Gazette B

13th and 14th wages are legal obligations in the private sector (banks pay even 14½2 While paying theCollective labor agreement expiry. All working conditions enter into private contracts3 Therefore unions have no incentive to enter into negotiations4Greek Law No 1082/1980 (Official Gazette A΄ 250/1980) and Ministerial Decision No 19040/1981 (Official΄ 742/1981) as amended by Ministerial Decision No 2006743/538/0022 (Official Gazette B΄

170/1991); National General Collective Labor Contract 15.07.2010, article 1. Greek Law No 4504/1966

(Official Gazette A

allowances have also been included in Labor Regulations as well as in all types of collective labor agreements

(branch, professional, enterprise).

΄ 57/1966); National General Collective Labor Contract 15.07.2010, article 2. Further, those

3

Greek Labor Law (L.1876/1990).

4

Paragraph 2 of article 16 of Law 1876/1990 as amended by article 14 of Law 3899/2010.

4

-

especially harmful for seasonal tourism activity. Further, working time reduction through

part-time work can only be done by reducing the number of working days worked but not

the hours per day worked.

-

do not apply to all firms. Moreover, in some firms and sectors, in case a reduction in the

workforce is necessary, management may be unable to choose those that will be let go.

-

exclusively legal arguments, and too lengthy.

-

Working time inflexibility. Restrictions on overtime, weekend work and work shifts areHiring/firing restrictions. Recent liberalizations (higher limit for collective dismissals)Mediation and arbitration mechanisms are relatively ineffective, too much based onJudicial procedures are far too lengthy.

Why do these distortions need to be addressed in law?

Employers explain that it is impossible to renegotiate internal legacy regulations because

unions have no incentives to do so:

- Legacy staff cannot be replaced by new private employees because of tenure,

- When the collective agreement expires,

all individual contracts, which takes away the bargaining power from the employer

- Inadequate mediation/arbitration; culture of favoring labor; majority is composed of

union or labor party lawyers; no use of economic analysis, only legal considerations.

- Judicial system – extremely lengthy, costly, and uncertain procedures to enforce layoffs.

all its favorable terms (for employees) carry into

Corrective actions to consider

A horizontal approach introducing a more level playing field is preferred over firm specific

interventions. However, in some cases specific legal intervention might be needed to repeal

legislated internal regulations for specific companies afflicted by specific restrictions.

Horizontal interventions to address the legacy issues of ex-state companies:

-

specifying that the compulsory dismissals of employees upon completion of a service or

age limit, do not render the relevant labor contracts of said employees of a definite

duration. For the privatization program, extend Art.40 of Implementation Bill I to

Chapter B companies; this would transform contracts of definite duration to private sector

5

contracts of indefinite duration, whereby standard layoff procedures would apply.

Tenure: introduce a legal provision to remove tenure in all private sector contracts by5

Further, introduce a legal provision that the reasons for dismissal which may be included

in Labor Regulations and/or Enterprise CLAs are considered to be indicative.

Disciplinary proceedings do not constitute a typical or essential precondition for

termination of the labor contract and do not limit such right to terminate in case of

offences that justify dismissals.

-

Maturity: introduce legal provision to freeze maturity in all private sector contracts.6

Obviously, firms that wish to do so must have the

negotiations. The aim, however, is to remove rules and privileges that effectively have

become barriers for firms’ sound management and flexibility to adapt to hard times.

-

rates, while taking the actuarial position of each pension scheme into consideration.

option to reintroduce maturity in theirLegacy SS contributions: reduce special SS contribution rates along IKA benchmark

Horizontal interventions to make the overall labor market more flexible:

-

of law (including ministerial decision and presidential decree)/labor regulation/collective

labor agreement. (Already eliminated and replaced with much less generous bonuses in

the general government.) As noted, while pay frequency is not a distortion per se, making

these bonuses optional is a coordinated way of reducing costs in the economy and

fostering competitiveness, employment, and growth. Therefore, firms should maintain the

13th and 14th wage. Introduce a legal provision to remove these bonuses in any provision

option

-

expiry of the collective labor agreement, the working conditions are determined by other

concurrent collective agreements (in the case of enterprise agreements by sectoral

agreements; in the case of sectoral agreements by national agreements). Employees

should not continue to receive all benefits from previous agreements, but these should be

able to adapt to changed circumstances, as needed for a healthy and responsive economy.

-

efficient and impartial mediation/arbitration mechanisms. In order to strengthen the

to reintroduce a bonus in their individual negotiations.Collective agreements expiry: introduce legal provision that upon 6 months of theMediation/arbitration: introduce economic analysis alongside legal considerations for

5

I, but did not extend this removal to Chapter B public firms or the private sector.

The public sector has removed tenure for Chapter A public companies’ employees in the Implementation Bill

6

on performance, but this reform was not extended to ex-state companies.

The public sector wage grid reform significantly reduced the maturity coefficient and made pay partially based

6

collective bargaining process, the labor arbitration procedure should be initiated only if

both parties (the Unions AND the Employer) agree to it being initiated.

-

alongside the possibility to reduce the number of working days already in effect. Further,

in seasonal industries exceptions to overtime/working hour arrangements/weekend work

should be introduced. In the education sector, private schools should be allowed to

increase teaching hours.

-

to

-

disputes

Flexibility: introduce a legal provision to allow reductions in hours worked per dayHiring/firing restrictions. Introduce a legal provision to extend the recent liberalizationall firms in the private sectorJudicial system: as with special tax courts, accelerate and simplify court cases of labor

Legal basis

The basis for these legal changes to private labor contracts should be “

with respect to the principle of proportionality”

.in the public interest(i.e. establishing a level playing field).7

Otherwise, the Constitution will not allow any changes. Indeed, there is precedent of the

Greek government intervening in collective agreements under this principle; for instance in

the government has intervened during 1985-87 to freeze wages so as to curb inflation.

Next steps:

•

Continue to collect information from affected companies and sectors.

•

increasing the chances of renegotiation of existing firm level agreements).

Discuss the policy scope for legal interventions during the next mission (including

•

to be screened for repeal.

Request the government to provide a survey of existing internal regulations that need

7

safeguards of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings. Essentially, it says that contracts and

agreements remain in place in the case of change of ownership of a firm. Thus, the rights and duties of the

employees from the transferred undertaking will be recognized and the transfer of an undertaking is not ground

for dismissal per se. In principle, the working conditions of the employees are maintained for the duration of the

collective agreement of the undertaking. However, these conditions may be amended, at least one year after the

transfer of the undertaking and if the Member States so authorize. This is especially relevant in SOEs that are to

be privatized.

Please note that any changes in legislation need to observe Directive 2001/23/EC, which establishes

7

Notes

Law 3522/2006 (Art 38 Para. 3) specifically created new labor conditions for newly hired

staff but kept tenure and maturity in place for legacy staff. Maturity also applies for newly

hired staff.

13

para. 1 and MD 19040/1981 and Law 4504/1966 Art 3, para. 16).

14½th (balance sheet bonus) payment in banks is provided for in law.

Some legacy firms pay 25% SSC against 13% for IKA by competitors (Law 3655/2008).

Is it possible to amend law 3899/2010 to reduce the weekly working time by 10-20% with

respective compensation to enhance working time flexibility.

Greek jurisprudence has adjudicated that in case of “contracts with a definite duration”

(legacy contracts), technical or company financial reasons

employment termination, except if the company gets liquidated.

Broadband penetration and investment in Greece is among the lowest in the EU. This is

related to excessive costs and regulatory rigidities.

There is documented evidence that in some firms, full time equivalent remuneration per

employee is much higher than full time equivalent remuneration per employee in competitor

firms in Greece or abroad. On top of this, productivity per employee in competitor firms is

much higher than in Greece. These excess costs are related to rigidities in labor markets.

Some companies cannot restructure their labor costs and become competitive in the export

market (where Greece has large potential) because they cannot engage in collective

dismissals as do other firms. The 2010 liberalization does not apply to all firms.

One company reported 150 bonus payments in its collective labor agreement, including a

“regularity allowance” (for showing up at work), computer screen allowance, standby

allowance, bagging allowance, vessel mooring allowance, etc.

Internal Regulation of Geniki Bank SA—Law 1048 DU 24/09/1975

Administrative and office personnel of some companies are swept into the hazardous and

arduous list of professions qualifying for special retirement privileges. The list for hazardous

jobs should be restricted to truly specific hazardous work assignments, not to entire firms.

Safeguarding employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings (Council Directive

2001/23/EC).th and 14th salary payments are provided for in law for private firms (Law 1082/80, Art 1,do not constitute a reason for

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION